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MICROFINANCE AS A DETERMINANT OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN BANGLADESH:  







This paper examines the impact that microfinance participation has on reported domestic 
violence rates among women in Bangladesh. While microfinance programs are aimed at 
reducing poverty, they may have unintended consequence and contribute to domestic violence or 
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). Using nationally representative data from the Urban Health 
Survey (2006), I study the association between microfinance participation and domestic violence 
among currently married women. The outcome variable is domestic violence, which is coded as 
a dummy variable, where a women either has experienced domestic violence episodes or she 
hasn’t. Predictor variables include microfinance participation, community attitudes, liberal 
views, labor force participation, and socioeconomic variables, such as age, marriage age, 
wages, education, and religion. My results indicate that microfinance was positively associated 
with incidences of domestic violence, especially among highly educated and wealthy women. 
Results also indicated that participants with daughters were more susceptible to violence. On the 
other hand, microfinance membership showed signs of reducing rates of IPV among participants 
living in villages, even when controlling for community attitudes towards domestic violence. 
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This paper studies the relationship of women’s participation in microfinance programs and 
domestic violence. Many see microfinance programs as a panacea to alleviate poverty; giving 
small loans to traditionally non-creditworthy individuals would give the destitute the ability to 
invest into ventures and raise income levels. Bangladesh has provided loans for poor women 
since the 1970s as a tool to combat poverty. Loaning to women became a particular area of 
interest for these banks because women had excellent repayment rates, which contributed to the 
sustainability of these organizations. Grameen Bank reported in 2009 that 98% of its 8 million 
borrowers were women (Loro, 2013).  
Past studies that examine the effectiveness of these programs have shown that they may 
play a role in reducing poverty but fail to reach the very poor (Swain et al., 2008; Abed and 
Martin, 2007; Khandker, 2005, 1998; Littlefield et al., 2003; Mann, 2003; Quach et al., 2003; 
Robinson, 2002; Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002; Manroth, 2001; Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and 
Cloud, 1999; Pronyk et al., 2007; Main and Hulme, 2003; Amin, Rai, and Topa, 2003); however, 
recent studies show that they may have no significant impact at all on combating poverty 
(Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman, 2015). As women participate in microfinance organizations, they 
typically become more empowered and less vulnerable (Hashemi, Schuler, and Riley, 1996; 
Hoque, 2004). There is conflicting evidence on how decision-making abilities and reported 
wellbeing are affected by microfinance participation (Steele, Amin, and Naved, 1998; Kelkar, 
Nathan, and Jahan, 2004; Kasynathan, 2001). Several of these studies have also noted increased 
contraceptive use among members and better health outcomes for the children of participating 
women (Khadker, 2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Pitt, Khandker, Chowdhury and Millimet, 





Although a powerful tool in relieving financial stress, microfinance programs, especially 
in conservative areas, come with unintended consequences. These programs challenge traditional 
gender norms by giving women exclusive access to income opportunities (some of these 
programs are restricted to women only or heavily favor women participation). Greater income 
can offer greater autonomy and status in the household, which can intimidate men and shake up 
conservative patriarchal structure, leading men to react violently. Several studies have focused 
on the relationship between microfinance organization and rates of intimate partner violence 
(IPV). Some studies show microfinance participation having a positive relationship with 
domestic violence (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Khan et al., 1998; Ahmed, 2003), some a 
negative relationship (Kabeer 1998; Hussain et al., 1998; Skinner, 1989; Levinson, 1989; Leach 
and Shashikala, 2002), and others no relationship at all (Abdullah, Quereshi, and Quayes, 2015). 
The conflicting evidence behind the effect that microfinance organizations have on rates of 
domestic violence makes it a continuing area of study for economists and policymakers who seek 
to find out more effective and efficient ways of alleviating poverty in developing countries. 
This paper serves to add on to the existing literature of microfinance participation and its 
links to domestic violence. I find that women of higher socioeconomic status who participate in 
microfinance programs are more susceptible to violence, confirming the work of some recent 
studies. Furthermore, I show that microfinance participants with daughters as opposed to sons 
are more susceptible to IPV, while participants living in villages are less prone to violence. I also 
find that membership in different microfinance organizations affects incidences of domestic 
violence. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature. 





the roles microfinance organizations play in poverty reduction. Then, I examine the literature 
relating to how these organizations may affect rates of IPV among women. Section 3 is the 
theoretical framework for my study. Section 4 is a review of my data, variables, and 
methodology. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics and the results of my model estimations, 





Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika, and ASA are the four major microfinance organizations in 
Bangladesh. Their primary aim is to alleviate poverty by giving small loans to poor individuals, 
particularly women. They break through traditional gender norms, encouraging women to 
become entrepreneurs and start small businesses. Over 30 million women have taken advantage 
of these opportunities (Lachman, 2011). They typically employ a group-lending model. This 
means that the microfinance group is responsible for the repayment of the loans of all its 
individual members. If one member is not able to pay back their loans, this would shut the whole 
group out from accessing loans in the future. Therefore, a strong bond built on mutual benefits 
and trust is formed among members. 
Many studies show that microfinance organizations have a positive effect on poverty 
reduction (Swain et al., 2008; Abed and Martin, 2007; Khandker, 2005, 1998; Littlefield et al., 
2003; Mann, 2003; Quach et al., 2003; Robinson, 2002; Vonderlack and Schreiner, 2002; 
Manroth, 2001; Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 1999). In a study of 2,250 microfinance 





saved much more of their income than non-participants. The study found that 52% of member 
households were below the poverty line, compared with 69% of non-participant households. The 
study also found that 27% of members were below the extreme poverty line, compared with 37% 
of non-members. Not only is the poverty of participants reduced, but there are spillover effects 
for non-participants. Khandker (2005) found that in areas where microfinance was available, 
poverty rates significantly dropped for both households receiving loans and for households not 
receiving loans, although more subtly. Chemin (2008) found that in Bangladesh microfinance 
participation had a positive effect on household expenditures. The findings of Khandker and Pitt 
(1998) indicate that a 1% increase in lending for women led to a 0.18% increase in annual 
household expenditures. However, this was quickly rebuked by Morduch (1999), who used the 
same data as Pitt and Khandker (1998) and found that this increase could be better explained by 
consumption smoothing over seasons and warned against the dangers of alleviating poverty 
through banking. The perceived positive poverty reduction effects of microfinance organizations 
and their spillover effects make them very attractive tools to policymakers the international 
community and allow these organizations to garner international praise.  
One of the critiques of the above studies is that they that do not disassociate causation 
and correlation. They suffer from selection bias; there is a self-selection of a certain type of 
women into these microfinance programs and where these programs choose to operate. In a 
study consisting of six countries, Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman (2015) use a randomized trial 
approach to establish causality and limit selection bias. They examine microfinance programs in 
Bosnia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, and Mongolia from 2003-2012. Although key 
estimates are positive in 4/6 countries, microfinance programs resulted in no statistically 





consumption. They do, however, see an increase in business activity and profit. Their results also 
found mixed results on microfinance participation and its effect on female decision-making. Of 
the four countries they looked at for female decision-making power, three found no statistically 
significant effect of microfinance participation, and one found a slightly positive statistically 
significant effect on female decision-making power. The study finds that the transformative 
effects of microfinance may be overstated; however, the authors note that microfinance programs 
still provide modest benefits on occupational choice, business scale, consumption choice, female 
decision-making power, and improved risk management.  
Many people have called into question the reach of microfinance programs and whether 
they are effective at reaching the most vulnerable populations. Several studies concluded that 
microfinance did not service the needs of the most destitute and vulnerable populations (Pronyk 
et al., 2007; Main and Hulme, 2003; Amin, Rai, and Topa, 2003). Daley-Harris and Zimmerman 
(2009) argued that microfinance programs might hurt the very poor because they may leave them 
debt ridden. In another study based on six Latin American countries, Gulli and Berger (1999) 
found that 23% to 93% of the very poor households were excluded from participating in 
microfinance programs and the ensuing benefits. At best, microfinance does not appear to aid the 
very needy. 
 
Microfinance, Women, and Domestic Violence 
In Bangladesh there are microfinance opportunities aimed at women, providing them with small 
loans. Over 30 million women have taken advantage of these opportunities (Lachman, 2011). 
Like increasing female employment, the goal of providing women loans is to increase women’s 
autonomy and economic mobility. There is a rich history of literature supporting the notion that 





outcomes (Amin, Rai, and Topa, 2003; Garikpati, 2008; Karim, 2011; Mayoux, 2011). Evidence 
also shows how these sort of programs improve family life. Women who received this sort of 
income were more likely to use it to improve the lives of their children (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; 
Pitt et al., 2006). For example, Kabeer (1998) found that when mothers received microfinance 
funding, their daughters were more likely to stay in school.  
There have been studies that have found that exposure to microfinance programs had 
negative effects on female autonomy. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1996) examined who actually 
controlled the microfinance loans women receive. The study showed that married women had 
little control over their loans, and even unmarried women were likely to give over their loans to 
nephews or sons-in-laws in exchange for a guarantee of a regular supply of food. Additionally, 
larger loans were more likely to be used by other household members. Another study found that 
while 100% male recipients of loans retained control over them, very few women did 
(Montgomery et al., 1996).  
Other studies show that microfinance participation led to greater female autonomy 
(Cheston and Kuhn, 2002; Lane, 2003; Noreen, 2011). In a study on rural Bangladesh, Pitt et al. 
(2006) found that women who participated in microfinance programs took on a greater role in 
household decision-making, had more economic resources, a stronger social network, more 
bargaining power in their relationships, and greater mobility. In a study based on Pakistan, Asim 
(2009) found no relationship between microfinance participation and female autonomy. There is 
inconsistent evidence on how socioeconomic status, microfinance participation, and female 
autonomy interact to affect domestic violence rates (Schuler et al, 1996; Bloch and Rao, 2002).  
Although a powerful tool in relieving financial stress and improving family life, 





they challenge traditional gender norms. An important area of study has been the role 
microfinance opportunities for women have on rates of domestic violence. There have been 
studies showing that increased participation in credit programs was correlated with increased 
domestic violence (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Khan et al., 1998; Ahmed, 2003). The 
occurrence of IPV along with microfinance appears to be related to status and income. One study 
showed that for wealthier women and women with secondary or higher education, membership 
in microfinance programs increased the exposure to IPV three and two times, respectively 
(Dalal, Dahlström, and Timpka, 2013). A recent study from Murshid et al. (2015) supports this 
claim, finding that the probability of experiencing domestic violence among microfinance 
participants was greater among wealthier individuals, and not for the poorest individuals; 
although, they found no correlation with domestic violence and education levels. 
There have also been studies showing the opposite is true, that credit programs were 
associated with less domestic violence due to increased economic prosperity (Kabeer, 1998; 
Hussain et al., 1998; Skinner, 1989; Levinson, 1989; Leach and Shashikala, 2002). Schuler 
(1996) found that access to these programs reduced domestic violence incidents because 
participation in credit programs made the lives women more public. Hadi (2000) found that 
sexual abuse and sexual violence was less prevalent among women who partook in credit 
programs and financially contributed in their families. Kabeer (2005) argued that microfinance 
lowered domestic violence rates because it lowered financial pressure and stress related to 
poverty among families, which reduced the need to externalize the stress through domestic 
violence. 
Other studies find no link between domestic violence and participation in microfinance 





domestic violence among microcredit participants can be attributed to self-selection. 
Bajracharya, Ashish, and Amin (2013) have argued that women who enter into microfinance 
programs are more susceptible to domestic violence because they are selective of disadvantaged 
characteristics (i.e., poor, less educated, and less autonomous). They found that when controlling 
for these factors through propensity score analysis there was a negligible effect of microfinance 
on domestic violence.  
Women who participate in microfinance are a particularly interesting case to look at 
when it comes to domestic violence. Evidence has shown that microcredit has increased income 
and cash-saving for the slum-dwellers (Alamgir et al., 2009). However, the help-seeking 
behavior of microcredit participants who suffer from domestic violence is an area of concern. A 
recent study shows that women who participate in microfinance programs are much less likely to 
seek help from both formal and informal agents (Sayem, Begum, and Moneesha, 2015). This 
suggests that microfinance participants who suffer from IPV are an especially vulnerable group 
and deserve greater attention. 
The conflicting evidence associated with autonomy, domestic violence, and microfinance 
suggests that more research must be done to understand the usefulness and effectiveness of 
microfinance. Thus, this paper adds on to the existing literature of the consequences of 
microfinance in Bangladesh, looking at particularly how different social status groups are 
affected by microfinance.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of status inconsistency can be applied to study microfinance use and 
its links to domestic violence. This theory suggests that differences in status leads to 





increase in status of the lower status person (Goode, 1971; Hornung, 1977; Yick, 2001). The 
theory contends that people feel imbalanced when they have a high status in one dimension and a 
lower status in another dimension. For example, a person who is highly educated but works a 
menial job may feel imbalanced. In this study a man may feel imbalanced if his wife, his 
subordinate according to cultural and patriarchal norms, has more economic potential or power 
than he deems appropriate. 
Status differentials and status imbalances can be “psychologically stressful” and so 
people engage in “stress reducing behavioral or attitudinal response,” (Horning, 1977, p. 624). 
Domestic violence is one way this response is played out; therefore, it is possible that the 
increased autonomy women receive via microfinance loans is likely to instigate domestic 
violence or perpetuate it. When a women joins a microfinance group, she is developing a source 
of income and not entirely dependent on her husband, giving her economic freedom and greater 
economic status. This in result may threaten her husband’s status, causing him to lash out at her 




I employed data from the Urban Health Survey (2006). This data is a nationally representative 
sample survey of urban slum and urban non-slum populations. Bangladesh’s National Institute of 
Population Research and Training (NIPORT) and The University of North Carolina’s 
MEASURE Evaluation created the survey. Associates for Community and Population Research, 
a Bangladeshi private research firm, assured the successful implementation of it. The data is 





The aim of the survey is to capture a broad profile of urban dwellers in Bangladesh. It 
provides information on various characteristics and measures for health-seeking behavior in the 
country. Some variables of interest that it captures include whether respondents are members of 
different organizations, migrants, smoking and drug abuse, chronic diseases, fertility and family 
planning, etc. The data contains 31,249 observations and 1,192 variables, a very healthy amount 
of data. It contains 15,979 male observations and 15,270 female observations. Whereas the data 
is rich in multiple aspects, for this paper, I looked at only married female observations and 
focused on measures of participation in microfinance groups and domestic violence incidences. 
 
Dependent Variable: Domestic Violence 
The primary dependent variable in this study is domestic violence. The survey asked if there 
were any disagreements which caused the respondent’s husband to do the following: 
1. Pushing or shaking you or throw something at you? 
2. Slapping you or twisting your arm? 
3. Punching you with his fist or with something that could hurt you? 
4. Kicking you or draging [sic] you? 
5. Trying to strangle you or killing you or burning you? 
A dichotomous variable was created to reflect domestic violence. If the respondent answered 
“yes” to any of the above questions, it was coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables were chosen as key measures of socioeconomic status and based on 









Age was determined by the respondent’s answer in the survey. 
 
Marriage Age 
This was the age of the respondent the first time they were married. 
 
Primary Wage 
Wages were determined by how much Taka the respondent earned through salary or wages in the 
past month. For this study, wages were looked at as a categorical variable broken up by four 
quantiles. The top three quantiles were compared against the bottom quantile. 
 
Education 
Two measures of education were used in this study. One measure, “years of schooling”, was 
measured as an interval variable as the highest grade of schooling a respondent completed. The 
other measure, “level of schooling”, was an ordinal variable with three levels—primary 
education, secondary education, and tertiary education. Secondary and tertiary education were 
measured against primary education. 
 





This was measured as a dichotomous variable, where if women were currently working, it was 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Islam 
This was coded as a dichotomous variable. If a respondent said their religion was “Islam”, it was 
coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Microfinance Participation 
Membership in a microfinance organization was coded as a dichotomous variable. If the 
respondent answered yes to being a member of at least one of the four major microfinance 
organizations, Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika, and ASA, then they were said to participate in 
microfinance organizations and the variable was coded as 1. If they said no, it was coded as 0.  
 I also looked at how membership in different organizations affected rates of IPV. 
Participation in Grameen Bank was coded as a dichotomous variable, where if they were a 
member of this organization, it was coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Another variable was used to 
look at participation in the other organizations. Because the survey grouped BRAC, Proshika, 
and ASA in one category, they are looked at together. If a women was a member of one of those 
three organizations, the dichotomous variable was coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Community Attitudes 
This variable was created to measure how a community’s views and acceptability of domestic 





developed based on five variables, which were based on five questions where men were asked if 
a husband was justified in beating his wife if: 
1. She neglects the children. 
2. She argues with her husband. 
3. She fails to provide food on time. 
4. She visits her family without her husband’s permission. 
5. She visits her friend without her husband’s permission. 
These questions were coded as dichotomous variables, so if one thought a husband was justified 
in beating his wife the variables were coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. The average of these five 
variables served as a proxy for a man’s acceptability of domestic violence. Then, these averages 
were averaged against the 512 primary sampling units (PSU) in the data, conceptually 
meaningful neighborhoods drawn from both slum and non-slum areas. This average then serves 
to highlight regional variances in the acceptability of domestic violence. 
 
Liberal attitudes 
To proxy for whether women have liberal attitudes I looked at how women looked at the prospect 
of women in the workforce. If a women said that it was acceptable for women to work outside the 
home for extra income when the husband is making enough money, she is said to have a liberal 








This is coded as a dichotomous variable; if a women responds “yes” to living in a village, it is 
coded as 1 and 0 if they live elsewhere. 
 
Daughters at home 
This dummy variable was created by selecting only for women who have children living at home. 
If a women had children living at home who were female, the variable was coded as 1 and 0 
otherwise. This means that a woman coded as 0 had only sons living at home. 
 
Methodology 
I start by calculating univariate descriptive statistics of the sample’s key independent variables, 
microfinance participation and socioeconomic status. I did the same for the key dependent 
variable, domestic violence. These demographic characteristics are provided on table 1 and table 
2.  
 Next, I looked at the association between the independent variables and domestic 
violence. Since domestic violence was operationalized as a binary variable (you either suffered 
from domestic violence or you didn’t), I used maximum likelihood probit regressions to 
determine how the various independent variables affected the likelihood of a women 
experiencing domestic violence. I used the statistical software R to carry out all statistical 









The full data set for women had 15,277 observations. Since the focus is on domestic violence, 
the sample was restricted to 11,202 currently married women, or 73% of the total sample. The 
age of women ranged from 13 to 59, with the average age being 31. Approximately 90% of the 
women interviewed identified as Muslims. There were a negligible amount of Hindus, 
Christians, and Buddhists. Two-thirds of women have attended some sort of schooling. About 
2,700 women, 24% of currently married women, indicated that they were currently working. The 
mean income for working women was 2,123 Taka a month.  
About 2,000 women partook in microfinance programs, 90% of which are married. Over 
one third of microfinance participants suffer from domestic violence. Women who participate in 
microfinance marry younger on average than those that do not participate in microfinance 
programs, especially those that face domestic violence. Microfinance participants tend to be less 
liberal than non-participants and those that suffer from domestic violence are much less likely to 
have liberal views.  
[Please insert table 2 here] 
A smaller proportion of microfinance participants have ever attended school compared to 
non-participants. Participants are also much less likely than non-microfinance participants to 
attend college or university (6% vs. 18%). Of those women that have faced domestic violence, 
there is almost no difference in the proportion of women that have attended school among 
microfinance participants and non-participants, although non-participants on average have more 
years of schooling than participants and are more likely to attend college or university. 
Unsurprisingly, women who do not suffer from IPV are more likely to have attended school. 
Two-thirds of women that do not deal with IPV and participate in microfinance have ever 





domestic violence and participate in microfinance are more likely to have higher education 
experience compared to women who face domestic violence, among both microfinance 
participants and non-participants. Over 80% of non-IPV victims and non-microfinance program 
participants have ever attended school, and they have attended for almost 9 years on average. A 
very large number (26%) of these non-victims and non-participants have higher education 
experience. 
Microfinance participants are more likely to be working and poorer compared to non-
participants. Of those that participate in microfinance, a greater proportion IPV victims are likely 
to be working compared to non-victims. IPV victims who participate in microfinance earn about 
37% less a month than victims who are non-participants. Women who face IPV have a much 
smaller monthly wage compared to women who do not face IPV. Women who suffer from 
domestic violence and participate in microfinance earn 18% less a month compared to non-
participant domestic violence victims and 23% less a month compared to women who participate 
in microfinance and do not suffer from IPV. 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
[Please insert table 3 here] 
Using a probit regression model, I estimate the likelihood of women experiencing domestic 
violence. The results are summarized in table 3. Schooling and marriage age are negatively 
correlated with incidences of domestic violence. On the other hand, community attitudes, labor 
force participation, microfinance participation, and being a Muslim have positive relationships 
with domestic violence. The coefficient estimate for microfinance participation is 0.286, which 





suffering from IPV. Having liberal views and age are not correlated with domestic violence. This 
supports the findings of existing studies.  
[Please insert table 4 here] 
 I use a linear regression robustness check as seen on table 4. It indicates that 
microfinance participation, community acceptability, labor force participation, and Islam are still 
positively associated with domestic violence. Education and marriage age are still negatively 
associated with domestic violence. 
[Please insert table 5 here] 
Next, I look at specifically how wages and schooling levels influence domestic violence 
rates. The results are shown in table 5. Women with more education have smaller rates of 
domestic violence; women who have tertiary education experience are half as likely as those 
with only primary education experience to suffer from domestic violence. Income shows a 
similar pattern. Women in the third and fourth quantile are much less likely to experience bouts 
of violence. The coefficient estimates for the third and fourth quantile are -0.412 and -0.508, 
respectively, which implies that women in these income groups are almost 40% less likely to 
report suffering from domestic violence. In this model, being liberal appears to be negatively 
correlated with domestic violence; however, it is statistically insignificant (p value > 0.05). This 
supports existing literature than indicates that women of higher socioeconomic status are less 
likely to suffer from IPV. 
[Please insert table 6 here] 
Table 6 show the results of interacting microfinance with education and wages. When 
interacting microfinance with education levels, my model shows that women who are college 





they are almost 3 times as likely as those with only primary school education to experience 
domestic violence. The coefficient estimate is 0.503 for women in the top quantile who 
participate in microfinance, which means they are almost 2 times as likely to experience bouts of 
domestic violence compared to those at the bottom quantile.  
Approximately 88% of the respondents have reported giving birth and 95% of those with 
children have their sons or daughter living with them. Women who have given birth show to be 
more exposed to domestic violence. There appears to be no statistically significant relationship 
between children living at home and domestic violence. When looking at having boys or girls 
living at home there appears to be a difference when microfinance is thrown into the equation. If 
a women has sons living at home there is no link to domestic violence. If a women has daughters 
living at home there also appears to be no link to domestic violence. However, my model shows 
a coefficient estimate of 0.491 if a women participates in microfinance and has daughters at 
home, which means she is almost 60% more likely to experience bouts of domestic violence 
compared to non-participants with sons at home.  
[Please insert table 7 here] 
About half of the respondents live in a village and about half of microfinance participants 
live in villages. The data indicates that 60% of domestic violence victims live in villages. On its 
own, living in a village is not correlated with domestic violence. However, when living in a 
village is interacted with microfinance, it is negatively correlated with domestic violence with a 
coefficient estimate of -0.473. Living elsewhere (in a city corporation, district town, or abroad) 
and participating in microfinance appears to have no relation to domestic violence incidences. 





 When controlling for attitudes for domestic violence, these results did not change—the 
interaction between microfinance and living in a village, when controlling for community 
attitudes towards domestic violence, still showed to be negatively correlated with bouts of 
domestic violence. 
[Please insert table 9 here] 
 Finally, I look at how domestic violence is affected by different microfinance institutions, 
specifically Grameen Bank compared to the other institutions, BRAC, ASA, and Proshika. My 
results show Grameen Bank to be slightly correlated with domestic violence, however, it is not 
statistically significant. The other institutions are still highly correlated with domestic violence. 
 
Discussion 
The work in this paper serves to add on to the available literature studying the effects of the 
determinants of domestic violence, specifically related to participation in microfinance 
organizations. Several qualitative and quantitative studies have found IPV to be negatively 
associated with microfinance participation (Kabeer 1998, 2005; Hussain et al., 1998; Skinner, 
1989; Levinson, 1989; Leach and Shashikala, 2002; Hadi, 2000). Other studies show increased 
rates of domestic violence among microfinance participants (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996; Khan 
et al., 1998; Ahmed, 2003). I find that latter to be true; domestic violence rates are positively 
correlated with microfinance participation, especially among wealthier and more educated 
women. College educated women that partake in microfinance organizations are almost 3 times 
as likely as non-participants to experience IPV and women in the top quartile who participate in 
microfinance are almost 2 times as likely as non-participants to experience IPV. These findings 





It is not clear as to why women of higher socioeconomic status participating in these 
microfinance programs are more susceptible to violence. Traditionally, higher household 
socioeconomic status and caste is shown to be negatively correlated with domestic violence 
(Evaluation Project, 1997; Hoffman et al., 1994; Jejeebhoy and Cook, 1997; Kim and Cho, 1992; 
Mahajan, 1990). However, there is inconsistent evidence with socioeconomic status and its effect 
on female autonomy and decision-making power (Schuler et al., 1996; Lane, 2003; Bloch and 
Rao, 2002). It could be that women with a higher socioeconomic status are not participating in 
these programs to raise their socioeconomic status, but instead may be participating in these 
microfinance programs to escape patterns of IPV. This hypothesis is supported by recent 
literature on the matter; Sayem, Begum, and Moneesha (2015) found that although women who 
participate in microfinance programs are much less likely to seek help from both formal and 
informal agents, women of higher socioeconomic status were more likely to seek out informal 
support and formal social support. Microfinance organizations can be an informal support system 
for these higher status women. 
 The literature shows that a mother’s exposure to microfinance has a positive effect on 
children, especially for daughters (Kabeer, 2005). I sought to look at how having children at 
home would affect IPV occurrences for microfinance participants. There appears to be no 
statistically significant correlation between living with children and domestic violence. When 
having children at home is correlated with microfinance there is still no effect. My results 
indicate, however, that when focusing specifically on women who have daughters that live with 
them, microfinance does have an effect on domestic violence. When women have daughters 
living at home and participate in microfinance organizations, they are almost two times more 





sons. The effect of microfinance participation along with having daughters is much stronger than 
the effect of microfinance on its own. Having sons living at home and the number of living sons 
has no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of experiencing domestic violence.  
The increase in domestic violence for mothers with daughters might be attributed to 
traditional gender views in Bangladesh. Although not supported by my data, other studies have 
shown that having sons reduced risks of domestic violence (Rao, 1997; Schuler et al., 1996). In 
South Asian countries, many families prefer to have sons because their sons can work, provide 
for the family, and are likely to stay with the family for a longer period of time. Daughters, on 
the other hand, are less likely to provide financial support for the family and are expected to 
leave the family after they are married. Having daughters instead of sons can be viewed as a 
handicap, hurting the earning potential and socioeconomic status of a family. The prevalence of 
female infanticide is an issue in South Asian countries and daughters are often discriminated 
against when it comes to the allocation of household resources (George, Abel, and Miller, 1992; 
Miller, 1997). It might be the case that a man, already frustrated with his wife for bearing 
daughters over sons, becomes more agitated with his wife engaging in microfinance programs. 
His status is already threatened because he has to raise daughters and it is once again threatened 
by his wife engaging in work outside the home. This can result in him responding with violence; 
therefore, a man with daughters and a wife participating in microfinance would be more likely to 
beat his wife than if she had bared sons and not participated in microfinance programs.  
This is a very serious issue because children who witness domestic violence growing up 
tend to develop emotional, behavior, and learning problems (Margolin, 1998). Moreover, this 
type of behavior becomes normal for these children. Daughters are likely to see physical abuse as 





accepting of violence. Research shows that children who live in households where domestic 
violence is a common occurrence are more likely to suffer from emotional, physical, and sexual 
abuse later in life (Holt et al., 2008). This sort of violence will continue to perpetuate harmful 
patriarchal ideals and domestic violence down the road and needs to be addressed immediately.   
Another interesting finding is that when women in villages participate in microfinance 
programs they are actually much less likely to experience IPV than if they didn’t participate or 
lived elsewhere. There was no statistically significant correlation with domestic violence when 
microfinance was interacted with living in other areas, such as a city corporation, town, or 
abroad.  
The strong effect microfinance has on IPV reduction among women in villages might be 
explained by a reduction in financial stress. Women living in villages on average are much 
poorer than those living in city corporations, towns, or abroad. Therefore, they are more likely to 
be financially strained. Microfinance programs would make village participants better off 
because they would have access to loans to help meet their financial needs. The financial stress 
relieved through microfinance participation would be very important to the husband and the 
family. The work of Kabeer (2005) supports this notion. She noted that women who participated 
in microfinance organizations saw reductions in violence. She argued that violent episodes 
dissipated because of economic stress reduction and because men started to see women as 
sharing responsibility in family provision rather than being another part of a man’s 
responsibility. Moreover, women are likely to use their loans to provide for their children, 
loosening the financial constraints of her husband (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Pitt et al., 2006). 
This would reduce household financial stress and not threaten a man’s status because his wife 





so much that her husband would be at risk of losing her. He would still be more likely to control 
the finances in the household and use of the loans. This reduction in stress and marginal, non-
threatening increase in female autonomy and bargaining power would help reduce episodes of 
IPV.  
Women in villages are generally much more susceptible to domestic violence because of 
their status. Women who live in villages on average have the lowest income of all the living 
areas in the data and are generally the least educated. Women in villages earn on average 17% 
less a month than those living in city corporations. Compared to those living in city corporations, 
women in villages on average do one less year of schooling. The literature shows that poorer and 
less educated women are much more susceptible to domestic violence (Bates et al., 2004; Khan, 
2005). Moreover, villages tend to be the more conservative areas. Koenig et al. (2003) found that 
short-term participation in microcredit groups in conservative areas lead to greater bouts of 
domestic violence. In my data, 45% of women in villages believe a man is justified in beating his 
wife, compared to 36% of women in district towns, and 38% of women in city corporations. 
When controlling for community attitudes towards domestic violence, living in a village 
interacted with microfinance still has a negative effect on the likelihood of women experiencing 
domestic violence. This implies that the effect of conservative attitudes in regards to domestic 
violence and the status inconsistency brought about as a result of microfinance participation 
would be outweighed by the fall in financial stress that microfinance entails. When women in 
villages participate in microfinance organizations, their husbands are less likely to look at them 
as burdens and more likely to see them as equals and an asset. 
 The variation in microfinance institutions and their effects on domestic violence is an 





violence, while participation in other organizations, like BRAC, ASA, and Proshika, are still 
found to be highly associated with domestic violence. This discrepancy can partially be 
explained by demographics. Grameen Bank members have a higher income on average 
compared to participants in other organizations (1,492 Taka a month compared to 1,384 Taka a 
month). They also tend to have attained more education than those in other microfinance groups; 
9% of Grameen Bank members have experience in tertiary education, as opposed to 6% of those 
in other groups. Grameen Bank members appear to have a higher socioeconomic status than 
members of other groups, so they are less likely to suffer from violence. However, that is not to 
say that these members are shielded from violence. While 65% of women from the other 
organizations suffer from domestic violence, 63% of Grameen Bank members also suffer 
domestic violence. Nonetheless, the variation among different microfinance groups is something 
that should be explored further and considered when developing microfinance programs. 
 
Limitations 
There are certain limitations with this study. One major issue is the underreporting of domestic 
violence. Bangladesh is a country where domestic violence is typically accepted, so acts that 
westerners might consider domestic violence are not seen in the same light there. There isn’t a 
stigma or alertness that comes with it like there is in the west, so women may underreport IPV 
incidences. My results show that 53% of married women in Bangladesh have experienced 
episodes of domestic violence. A survey conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and 
the United Nations Population Fund found that 87% of Bangladesh married women are abused 





the accuracy of my results and understate the severity of domestic violence experienced by 
members of microfinance organizations. 
  Another limitation is due to the nature of the data used. For this study I used cross-
sectional data and not longitudinal data; therefore, it is not possible to establish effects on 
domestic violence from before and after program participation. There are also issues with 
establishing causality because of endogeneity, having the explanatory variables correlated with 
the error term, which makes it is difficult to discern the direction of the relationship between 
participation in microfinance programs and domestic violence. There are also many variables 
that are omitted and cannot be measured, which rules out the possibility of establishing definitive 
causality.  
 For this study, I coded my main explanatory variable, microfinance participation, based 
on the participation in at least one of these four organizations: Grameen Bank, BRAC, Proshika, 
and ASA. There may be differences in the way these organizations carry out their loans and 
operations, which would explain my results when I examined at specific organizations. One 
group may carry out their operations in a way that may instigate domestic violence, while 
another may not. For example, some are more open to allowing males to participate, while others 
are not. While 98% of Grameen Bank’s customers are women, only 71% of ASA’s customers 
are women and 66% of Proshika’s Employment and Income Generating funding goes to women 
(Loro, 2013; Choudhury, 2008; Proshika). Males may be less likely to resort to violence if they 
are able to get loans along with their wives. These differences between organizations are not 
measured because the survey does not differentiate among the organizations nor does it ask male 





organizations are not accounted for and therefore can skew the actual effects microfinance 
participation have on domestic violence.  
 
Policy Implications 
Several policy implications can be drawn from the results to deal with the prevalence of 
domestic violence among microfinance participants. Actions can be taken by both the 
Bangladeshi government and the organizations themselves to reduce the severity and incidences 
of IPV among participants. The government of Bangladesh can provide more anti-domestic 
violence resources to the organizations and utilize data provided by microfinance organizations. 
The organizations themselves can reduce domestic violence through education and developing 
stronger bonds among members and the community.  
The government of Bangladesh can provide microfinance organizations with resources to 
reduce the severity of domestic violence. Since women who participate in these organizations are 
more likely to experience domestic violence, the government can provide organizations with 
funds to invest in anti-domestic violence resources. The microfinance organizations can use 
these funds to set up educational workshops for women and their spouses and give women 
information on how to mitigate domestic violence and how to appropriately report incidences of 
domestic violence.  
Funds can also be used to provide women with mentors and social workers. Mentors 
would provide these women with important perspectives and key advice to allow them to use 
their loans wisely. This can help increase the poverty reduction abilities of loans, reducing 
financial stress and the likelihood a women would experience domestic violence. Exposure to 
social workers would provide women outside resources they can reach out to and discuss issues 





domestic violence and give them advice and tools on how to best deal with their situations. 
Together, the availability of mentorship and social workers would help reduce incidences and the 
severity of IPV. 
Authorities can be provided access to microfinance participant data. If authorities have 
access to this sort of data they can help mitigate domestic violence incidences among those that 
are most vulnerable, such as women with daughters and wealthier and more educated women. 
Authorities would be able to classify these microfinance participants as high-risk for IPV and 
would be able to reach out to these individuals to see if women were suffering from IPV and act 
accordingly. They can be present at the microfinance organizations or continually check up on 
high-risk women to ensure that they are safe. If these women are given a more direct line for 
reporting IPV, they have more opportunities and the tools required to escape abusive 
relationships. 
Microfinance organizations can also be given tools to be more family inclusive and 
provide women with a stronger social structure and standing. Schuler (1996) found that when a 
women’s life, through microfinance participation, was made more public, she was less likely to 
suffer from domestic violence. Microfinance organizations can encourage their participants to be 
more public or provide public events, such as monthly community lunches or dinners and 
holiday festivities. This can help increase the public exposure of its participants and strengthen 
bonds among participants, so there are more avenues for intervention. These sort of activities 
would give women more roads to report IPV incidences and would reduce the severity and 
likelihood of domestic violence. 
Microfinance organizations can also help reduce domestic violence episodes by pouring 





participants live in villages. Women who live in villages seem to benefit the most from 
microfinance organizations, both through lessening financial stress and reduction in incidences 
of IPV. Greater marginal utility is achieved through diverting some of the resources that go 
towards women in cities to women in villages. These women would become empowered, less 
financially stressed, and would be much less likely to suffer from domestic violence thanks to 
these microfinance organizations. 
 
Conclusion 
Microfinance has been accessed by over 30 million women in Bangladesh, but it is not a panacea 
to alleviating poverty in developing countries. Its ability to reduce poverty is limited, and many 
times it fails to reach the poorest of the poor. It also challenges traditional gender norms, which 
can be dangerous in traditionally conservative and highly religious countries like Bangladesh. By 
challenging these cultural norms, it can set up the people it is supposed to help to face greater 
adversity. Women in particular are a huge market for microfinance and are also the ones most 
likely to suffer from the side effects of these programs. I found microfinance participation to be 
strongly associated with domestic violence, particularly among higher income and educated 
women. It also is a particular issue for mothers with daughters, which is concerning. However, it 
serves to be a very effective program for participants in village, largely reducing incidences of 
domestic violence. Although imperfect, microfinance is still a tool that governments can use to 
promote entrepreneurship among the impoverished. Participation in microfinance programs 
should still be encouraged, but the limitations should be understood and the potential side effects 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Study Sample
Characteristics Married Women Non-microfinance Microfinance
N 11,202 9,239 1,960
Age
10-14 0.00 0.00 0.00
15-19 0.12 0.10 0.06
20-24 0.21 0.20 0.18
25-29 0.17 0.19 0.18
30-34 0.14 0.16 0.17
35-39 0.13 0.13 0.17
40-44 0.10 0.10 0.12
45-49 0.06 0.05 0.06
50-54 0.05 0.04 0.04
55-59 0.02 0.02 0.01
Education
Attended School 0.67 0.68 0.60
Average Schooling Years 7.33 7.57 6.00
Primary Education 0.38 0.35 0.51
Secondary Education 0.46 0.46 0.43
Tertiary Education 0.16 0.18 0.06
Currently Working 0.24 0.23 0.26
Average Monthly Income 2,124 2,243 1,414
Islam 0.91 0.91 0.91
Age at First Marriage 16.05 16.24 15.15























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Akaike Inf. Crit. 9,178.610
Note: This is a probit regression model. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
























Residual Std. Error 0.462 (df = 7455)
F Statistic 147.901∗∗∗ (df = 8; 7455)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01









Wage Quantile 2 −0.124
(0.140)
Wage Quantile 3 −0.412∗∗∗
(0.128)
















Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,416.482
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01










Wage Quantile 2 −0.155 −0.016
(0.139) (0.092)
Wage Quantile 3 −0.453∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.090)






Microfinance*Wage Quantile 2 −0.287
(0.209)
Microfinance*Wage Quantile 3 0.280
(0.219)













Log Likelihood -693.845 -1,351.342
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,413.690 2,724.684
Note: These are probit regression models. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01






Daughters At Home 0.019 −0.064
(0.073) (0.080)
Microfinance*Daughters At Home 0.491∗∗
(0.196)
Wage Quantile 2 −0.169∗ −0.173∗
(0.095) (0.095)
Wage Quantile 3 −0.247∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096)
Wage Quantile 4 −0.639∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.098)
Community Attitudes 0.511 0.487
(0.320) (0.321)









Log Likelihood -955.940 -952.790
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,931.880 1,927.580
Note: These are probit regression models. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01










Years of Schooling −0.092∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Wage Quantile 2 −0.109 −0.113
(0.140) (0.140)
Wage Quantile 3 −0.400∗∗∗ −0.399∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.129)
Wage Quantile 4 −0.520∗∗∗ −0.516∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.130)









Log Likelihood -702.742 -700.746
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,425.484 1,423.492
Note: These are probit regression models. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01








Secondary Education −0.208∗∗ −0.226∗∗
(0.091) (0.091)
Tertiary Educcation −0.668∗∗∗ −0.654∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.146)
Wage Quantile 2 −0.169 −0.124
(0.138) (0.140)
Wage Quantile 3 −0.469∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.128)




Community Attitudes −0.207 −0.194
(0.405) (0.406)









Log Likelihood -701.354 -696.241
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,426.708 1,416.482
Note: These are probit regression models ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
